nashealthcare.blogg.se - Ip socksescort

Ip socksescort full#
Ip socksescort software#
Ip socksescort windows 7#

We left it to run for 2 weeks but we didn’t have any successful logons (at least we removed the problem with the Morto Worm). Then we looked at the security features of RDP, and we found that Morto was not able to log in on RDP with NLA enabled (see here for NLA details: Microsoft msdn NLA). We then changed our credentials to pos/pos.Let’s check our list of words first to avoid the one tested by the Morto Worm. That was our first fail as this was not the kind of binaries that we are interested in. More information can be found on the internet here: Microsoft Worm:Win32/Morto.A or here Trend Micro – Threat encyclopedia. A really old (2011) worm that is still active, that is basically after the successful infection brute forcing RDP to try to infect a new host. A successful connection through RDP on our honeypot! But after analysis, we identified that the binary pushed on the honeypot was in fact the “Morto” worm. First infectionĪfter 3 hours, we got a hit. The goal of the setup was to mimic an actual POS and to fool cyber criminals. The website selling the leather and fur items We created a fake website hosted on the same IP, pretending to sell leather and fur items. We enabled RDP (TCP port 3389) with weak credentials (admin/123456).

Ip socksescort software#

We installed a POS software (it doesn’t matter which one).

Ip socksescort windows 7#

Our setup was based on Windows 7 (32 bits).

And an OSSEC agent on the host, so we can directly create dashboards on specific events (in our case RDP connections).

A local Bind DNS, to see directly all DNS requests in a text file.

We also installed mitm-proxy, a python library that can be used for different Man-in-the-middle tasks.

An IDS based on Suricata and the SELKS distribution, always interesting to see directly what kind of malware is beaconing to its CnC.

Ip socksescort full#

We installed Moloch as a full packet capture tool, very useful when you need to drill down on packets and sessions.The first infrastructure was hosted in Europe and included all the tools to monitor the honeypot (in terms of host and network). The goal of this post is to explain how we created a honeypot for POS with open source tools and custom scripts, and to show the results from 3 months of running a honeypot (samples, TTP, groups …). But what do we know really about POS malware? Can we create groups of malware and relate them to groups of cyber criminals? As is the case for standard malware, we need a honeypot for POS, so we can publicly share the TTP (techniques, tactics, and procedures) of POS cyber criminals. Obviously, details of this kind of breach cannot be made public (banks, ongoing investigation, reputation …). Not a month goes by without news about another new POS (point-of-sale) malware or credit card data breach.